floof.org
And that's how you compromise all of TLS, worldwide, in one go. (The broken CAs can presumably issue certificates for *any* name in DNS, and it's the same for all the dozens of other CAs, even the obscure ones, because most (all?) of the CAs in the root trust stores are not, as far as I know, scoped in any way.) (I'm sure someone will correct me if these "presumably"s and "as far as I know"s are wrong.)
Go to https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/ , scroll down to "Does your client still trust the compromised intermediates?" and check that your browser is correctly failing to connect to certificates from all 8 of the bad intermediates.
4 times the SECP384-R1 base point is(0x138251cd52ac9298c1c8aad977321deb97e709bd0b4ca0aca55dc8ad51dcfc9d1589a1597e3a5120e1efd631c63e1835, 0xcacae29869a62e1631e8a28181ab56616dc45d918abc09f3ab0e63cf792aa4dced7387be37bba569549f1c02b270ed67)https://repository.emsign.com/certs/EMOVTLSCAG3C.crt
for the non-cryptographers at the back of the room: the private key is 4, just the number 4, nothing more
Certificate:<br> Data:<br> Version: 3 (0x2)<br> Issuer: C=IN, O=eMudhra Technologies Limited, CN=emSign Root TLS CA - G3<br> Subject: C=US, O=eMudhra Inc, CN=EM OV TLS CA - G3C<br> Subject Public Key Info:<br> Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey<br> Public-Key: (384 bit)<br> pub:<br>04:13:82:51:cd:52:ac:92:98:c1:c8:aa:d9:77:32:<br>1d:eb:97:e7:09:bd:0b:4c:a0:ac:a5:5d:c8:ad:51:<br>dc:fc:9d:15:89:a1:59:7e:3a:51:20:e1:ef:d6:31:<br>c6:3e:18:35:ca:ca:e2:98:69:a6:2e:16:31:e8:a2:<br>81:81:ab:56:61:6d:c4:5d:91:8a:bc:09:f3:ab:0e:<br>63:cf:79:2a:a4:dc:ed:73:87:be:37:bb:a5:69:54:<br>9f:1c:02:b2:70:ed:67<br> ASN1 OID: secp384r1<br> NIST CURVE: P-384<br>
